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3.1 Introduction 
Following the naturally evolving requirements of the ISOLDE Collaboration, the ISOLDE facility 
develops new radioactive ion beams to extend the assortment of the 800 Radioisotope Beams (RIBs) 
available today. The R&D work on ion sources, new target materials, or new beam purification 
methods is closely related to the constant effort to improve the lifetime and reliability of the 
equipment.  
The lifetime of ISOLDE targets at the PS booster is of the order of a million proton pulses 
which corresponds to a few 1019 protons. The proton beam pulsed structure is at the origin of the 
thermal-shock-induced material sintering and is today’s limitation to the target lifetime characterized 
by a drop of the radioactive ion beam yield. Independently, for high-Z target materials (U, Th, Pb, and 
Ta), the integrated radiation dose generated by 1020 GeV protons corresponds to the radiation hardness 
limit of the weakest component, namely, the vacuum vessel sealing. The average proton-beam 
intensity upgrade from 2 μA to 10 μA would therefore proportionally increase the frequency of 
changes of today’s standard targets. The setting up time (3–6 days) of a target unit would then be 
longer than the RIB production period and would become the limiting factor.  
While the target handling is done via industrial robots, the maintenance of the equipment of the 
facility requires human intervention. Therefore, the radiation doses on staff must be minimized by 
developing maintenance-free equipment or dedicated remote-controlled handling systems.  
The EURISOL-DS European project [1] is currently developing targets and target stations for 
orders of magnitude higher proton beam power. Evident synergies on modelling, materials 
development and design of remote handling equipment will be exploited. 
In Section 3.2, the implications of a proton-beam intensity increase on the electrostatic 
accelerators are discussed; Section 3.3 deals with the necessary upgrade of the vacuum system while 
Section 3.4 covers the aspects of targets and ion sources. The adaptation of the facility to the 
radioprotection and waste disposal issues outlined in Chapter 6 of this report is considered in 
Section 3.6. The civil engineering is considered in Section 3.5 and target handling in Section 3.7. 
3.2 Electrostatic accelerators 
The so-called ‘front-end’ is composed of two vacuum sections: the electrostatic acceleration section 
consisting of a moveable electrode, two pairs of electrostatic deflectors and the platform supporting 
the remote-controlled vacuum coupling of the target unit; and the beam optics section containing an 
electrostatic quadrupole triplet and a Faraday cup used to monitor the total ion-beam current. Two 
1000 l s–1 turbo pumps and two all-metal valves are suspended below the vacuum vessel. The front-
end is supported by a vehicular chassis to ease its hands-on maintenance. It is connected to the 
separator beam line, inside an aluminium Faraday cage and perpendicular to the proton beam 
trajectory. Cables and fluids are connected to the front-end either on ground potential or from a high-
voltage platform via a HT transfer tube (Boris tube). 
3.2.1 Optics 
With a view to minimizing the number of moving parts, and consequently the number of human 
interventions, the ion-beam optics will be studied with the objective of removing the extraction 
electrode mechanism. While this solution will minimize occasional interventions throughout the year, 
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the exchange of extraction electrode tips that are the most contaminated parts (contact dose rate of the 
order of 1 Sv/h) must also be addressed. The new front-ends should be designed so that interventions 
are reduced to an absolute minimum while the performance of the front-end, at a higher dose rate, 
remains constant. 
3.2.2 Cabling and fluids 
The insulation of all cables within the vicinity of the front-end is subject to radiation damage. All 
cables must be insulated with the most radiation-resistant material possible; provisions should be made 
for the quick exchange of cables in the event of a breakdown. The same quick exchange practice 
should also apply to all compressed-air and water-cooling components and distribution. In the event of 
a complete front-end exchange, all connections should be rapidly accessible. Ideal on paper, remote-
controlled connections should be designed such that their own maintenance does not add to the dose. 
3.2.3 Alignment 
To limit the time spent in situ while aligning a new front-end, a new and faster protocol should be 
devised. The front-end should be pre-aligned on a reference jig prior to installation. External 
alignment points should then be used for verification while the final beam axis adjustment is obtained 
by electrostatic deflectors. 
3.2.4 Target coupling 
The existing remote target coupling system is very sensitive to mechanical tolerances. At present, the 
electrical, fluid, and vacuum connections are simultaneously provided and coupled remotely by one 
compressed-air piston. In the event of a slight misalignment, the system is jeopardized during the 
coupling phase. The fact that the front-end is sealed with a mechanical shutter sets stringent safety 
requirements on those who need to intervene in case of potential hazardous contamination. Once this 
mechanical shutter is open, experience has shown that volatile contamination is prone to migrate from 
the unsealed on-line front-end. The vacuum coupling could be dissociated from the mechanical 
coupling of electrical and fluid connectors. This would also address the risk of pumping on a large 
vacuum leak that rapidly fills the exhaust-gas storage tanks. 
3.2.5 Vacuum equipment 
Access to the vacuum equipment on the front-end (turbo-molecular pumps, valves, vacuum gauges, 
etc.) is already strictly limited on account of the ambient dose rate in the front-end Faraday cage. One 
proposal is to extend the vacuum pumping ducts of the front-end so as to house the vacuum equipment 
farther away and shielded from the main radioactive source. Owing to the confinement of the existing 
facility, this would imply the construction of a service gallery above the existing Faraday cage. The 
consequences of such a gallery are discussed in Section 3.6.1. 
3.2.6 High-voltage power supply 
The present pulsed 60 kV high-voltage power supplies are designed to recover to 60 kV (± 1 V) within 
a time interval of 6 ms [2]. Recent tests have shown that the use of a high-Z converter coupled to 
actinide targets producing n-rich fission isotopes [3] has already imposed limitations on the voltage 
recovery time due to the heavier dynamic load generated by an increased temporal ionization profile 
from secondary particles. Increasing the proton pulse intensity would require a full re-evaluation of the 
power supply design. 
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3.2.7 High-voltage transport tube 
The two existing 7 metre long high-voltage transport tubes consist of an inner aluminium tube kept 
under high voltage, centred and separated from the external grounding tube by two Araldite insulators 
at either end. In 2006, after 14 years of exposure to high radiation levels, the insulators in the Faraday 
cages are showing signs of degradation leading to high-voltage breakdowns. Although a temporary 
repair is planned for the 2006/2007 shutdown period, a more reliable solution needs to be developed 
for the HIE-ISOLDE upgrade. In parallel, and as mentioned in Chapter 6, the HT transport tubes 
provide a direct pathway between the highly radioactive Faraday cage and the high-voltage power 
supply room. Consequently, the design of the new high-voltage transport tubes should also include 
dedicated shielding or chicanes and be compatible with the eventual construction of a service gallery. 
3.3 Vacuum 
There are many aspects to the vacuum issues in the event of an upgrade to 10 µA proton beam. These 
include the integrated vacuum system of the front-end, the target units, the primary pumping system, 
and the collection, storage, and exhaust of radioactive gases [4]. 
3.3.1 Front-end vacuum system 
The proposal to extend the vacuum pumping ducts requires an engineering study. Pumping speed, 
vacuum pressures, system design and controls are only part of the extensive study. 
3.3.2 Target units 
The installation of metallic sealing on all feed-throughs implies an increase in the sealing pressure and 
non-reusability of the sealing. A major modification of the standard geometrical arrangement with 
repercussions on the front-end coupling is unavoidable. The engineering study should clarify within 
two years the constraints of a metallic and ceramics based vacuum vessel on the front-end. 
3.3.3 Primary pumping system 
At present, an array of four roughing pumps assures the primary pumping of both front-ends. 
Although reliable, it is currently located in a highly radioactive zone and is itself a strong radiation 
source due to the capturing of long-lived radioactive isotopes in the pump oil. These concerns must be 
addressed; to provide easier access, the pumping array could be situated in the same aforementioned 
service gallery. However, as the contamination of the pump oil requires that the oil be changed with 
the utmost precaution in a Class A type radioactive laboratory [5], the possibility of containing the 
contamination before capture by the pump oil should also be investigated. 
3.3.4 Exhaust-gas storage 
Currently, the exhaust gases of the primary pumps after repeated target changes are stored up to an 
over-pressure of 2 bar in two separate tanks approximately 3 m3 each. During the shutdown period and 
after a minimum of three months radioactive decay, the gases are released into the atmosphere under 
the supervision and monitoring of the radiation protection service. As mentioned in Chapter 6 of this 
report, the radiation protection service recommends that the exhaust gases should be stored at an 
under-pressure to minimize the consequences of accidental leakage. This would imply an increase in 
the number of storage tanks required to store the present quantity of exhaust gases. An increased front-
end volume, more frequent target changes, and a five-fold increase in proton-beam intensity are all 
factors that need to be considered when dimensioning the new storage tanks. 
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3.4 Targets and ion sources 
Target and ion source development will be a key issue for the HIE-ISOLDE project. Connectivity and 
geometry with respect to a new front-end have already been mentioned, however, emphasis should be 
put on improving the reliability and lifetime of target and ion-source systems and their performance. 
3.4.1 Targets 
The PS booster provides proton pulses of up to 3 × 1013 protons within 2 μs. The quasi instantaneous 
heating generates thermal shocks that in the past led to the destruction of the target Ta oven and today 
contribute to the rapid sintering of the target material [6]. By keeping the same irradiation parameters, 
the typical target lifetime of seven days would shorten with increased intensity. A proportional 
increase of the target diameter and proton-beam size leading to quadratic reduction of the temperature 
jump but increased target volume (and increased effusion time) may be unavoidable. 
3.4.2 Transfer line, oven, and effusion 
Once the target material arrangement is optimized, the desorption enthalpies define the residence time 
of chemicals on substrates and, therefore, the effusion time. For some of the slowly released elements, 
the choice of rhenium or carbon, for example, instead of tantalum as construction material for the 
transfer line and oven would speed up the effusion process considerably. Systematic studies of 
desorption enthalpies have been published and were investigated for RIB production by the 
TARGISOL EU-project [7]. 
3.4.3 Beam purification 
Beam purity is an important key to the success of experiments, therefore, the suppression of easily 
ionized alkali isobaric contamination must be pursued. Internal drift fields for Ta targets and micro 
bunching increased the signal-to-noise ratio up to a factor of 5. Despite a reduction of the RILIS 
efficiency by at least a factor of 100, orders of magnitude improved signal-to-noise ratio are expected 
from electrostatic suppression of surface ionized ions. On-line tests are pending. Chemical separation 
of alkali elements in a quartz transfer line is a promising purification method [8]. On-line tests have 
demonstrated that the quartz surface keeps its properties while coupled to an out-gassing high-
temperature container. 
3.4.4 Ion sources  
ECR ion sources for gaseous elements and RILIS dedicated ionization schemes for new elements such 
as mercury and gold will be developed. Systematic modelling of the plasma and beam-optics 
properties of existing ion sources will be undertaken. The planned measurements of emittances and 
efficiencies of existing and new ion source designs are the observables that will validate their 
simulation. 
3.5 Radiation protection 
3.5.1 FLUKA simulations 
To fulfil the criteria highlighted in Chapter 6 of this report, a detailed FLUKA [9] simulation of the 
existing ISOLDE target area will define the critical issues and provide the parameters for the major 
changes to the existing facility. 
3.5.2 Radioactive waste characterization 
The estimation of the produced radioactive waste resulting from high-energy accelerators and facilities 
is an obligation stated in CERN’s radioprotection manual. A program is being written to follow up the 
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irradiation of ISOLDE targets and the decay of the produced radionuclei over decades. The release 
parameters, the ionization efficiency, and the chemical form of the released elements will be 
integrated to identify the final destination (target, vacuum system, separator or experiments) of 
specific radio-elements. The description of the full process is complex and rather than ultimate 
precision, the model aims at characterizing the various transport mechanisms and opening the path for 
specific optimizations. The final radio-isotope cartography is a vital element for the radioactive waste 
inventory. 
3.5.3 Radioactive waste transport intermediate storage and conditioning  
Irradiated targets are stored at for least four, and up to eleven months in a dedicated area located 
between the irradiation zone and the Class A laboratory. The irradiated targets are then transported to 
a remote intermediate storage for a period of 10 years and then brought back to the Class A laboratory 
for conditioning prior to disposal. The target handling system should be reviewed to accommodate 
higher activities, a remote handling procedure must be designed to operate within the Class A 
laboratory and a similar system must be installed at the intermediate storage location for the reception 
of used targets. The transport of irradiated targets between the Class A laboratory and the intermediate 
storage requires dedicated shielding and confinement matching today’s standards in matters of 
radioactive transport. The transport procedure should be executed with a minimum of human 
intervention. 
The intermediate storage requires a dedicated aerosol monitoring system and an upgrade of the 
access control. 
A preconditioning programme prior to shipment to the Paul Scherrer Institute for further 
treatment has already started at ISOLDE. Basically, the preconditioning consists of separating and 
identifying the different materials of a target unit, with emphasis on separating aluminium, before 
storing them in standard 200 l drums. Whilst after 10 years cooling this is feasible in fume cupboards 
with slightly radioactive low-Z targets, high-Z and more radioactive targets will have to be processed 
in a dedicated hot cell currently under design.  
3.6 Civil engineering 
An upgrade to 10 µA of proton-beam intensity will inevitably lead to civil engineering modifications 
of the existing facility. The proposal of an overhead service gallery, improved shielding, and the 
modification of the target handling system are major contributions to the final design of the future 
ISOLDE target area. Furthermore, owing to the higher levels of unfixed contamination, the 
construction of a new facility will have to abide by the Class A regulations defined by the Office 
Fédéral de la Santé Publique [10]. Each aspect of the infrastructure services should be identified and 
implemented within the new building. These include ventilation, fluids, cabling, controlled access, 
target handling, vacuum systems, etc. 
3.6.1 Service gallery 
Concerning the overhead service gallery, the issue of converting an existing tunnel to a shielded 
building spanning the Swiss–French border has first to be addressed. The existing earth mound will 
provide insufficient shielding in the event of a five-fold increase in proton-beam intensity so its 
replacement by shielding blocks seems unavoidable. The overhead service gallery could be 
incorporated into the extra shielding and at the same time, by installing a roof, the issue of activated 
rain water, identified in Chapter 6, could be properly addressed. Already discussed as a solution to 
distance vacuum equipment from the source of radiation, the option of a service gallery could satisfy 
similar requirements for both the front-ends and other services already housed in the target zone. This 
includes the primary pump array, exhaust-gas storage tanks, ventilation equipment to mention but a 
few. 
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3.6.2 Closure 
Should a major overhaul of the existing building be approved, past experience during the construction 
phase of the Class A laboratory has shown that running a facility during parallel construction work is 
not an option. This is even more evident in the case of HIE-ISOLDE and such an overhaul will require 
the closure of the facility for at least 18 months. 
3.7 Target handling 
The present target handling system consists of two modified industrial robots controlled remotely from 
the robot control room in Building 179. Built and installed in 1995, the robot system was upgraded in 
2002 to prolong its expected lifetime to 2010. Beyond this date, the unavailability of spare parts along 
with the continuous irradiation of the robot arms parked in the target area will inevitably have an 
impact on the maintenance of the system. The actual system is also very limited in terms of flexibility 
and the adoption of a new target design may be unacceptable both in terms of weight and 
programming. 
3.7.1 A new target handling system 
It is proposed to install a new state-of-the-art robot system which will have, besides the specifications 
of the existing system, more flexibility in terms of programming and a manual backup system in the 
event of an automatic sequence failure. When not in use, the robot arms will be stored behind adequate 
shielding. 
3.7.2 A new front-end intervention device 
With an expected five-fold increase in the radioactive dose rate at the front-end, human intervention 
for maintenance and repair will be at an utmost minimum. The design and construction of a shielded 
manipulator/transport device will be essential for both minor interventions and an eventual front-end 
exchange. 
3.7.3 Target zone observation of remote-controlled handling 
The exposure of the existing cameras to current radiation levels in the target zone has often 
contributed to their premature failure and annual exchange. A more adequate and reliable camera 
system, possibly shielded when not in use, will be required to assure the target manipulations both in 
automatic and manual mode. 
3.7.4 Target storage 
The current position of the used-target short-term storage hinders all access to the remaining areas of 
the target zone. Either the shielding of these targets should be improved or their storage should be 
moved to another more convenient area of the target zone. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter describes the targets, electrostatic accelerators, and target area issues and necessary 
upgrades of the ISOLDE facility related to a proton-beam intensity increase to 10 µA. Many of these 
represent the much needed upgrade and maintenance of the existing facility after 14 years of operation 
and in addition cover the necessary modifications required to accommodate the intensity increase of 
the HIE project.  
The relative aspects of these changes regarding the target units, electrostatic accelerators and 
target area infrastructure have been outlined in this report. Further in-depth studies and a close 
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collaboration with other CERN specialists are required to finalize the project that should be started 
well in advance of the eighteen months required to transform the facility.  
The upgrade of the targets, front-ends, target area, and infrastructure is a project in itself to be 
managed in close collaboration with the radioprotection service.  
A first-approach cost and manpower evaluation is estimated at 8.8 MCHF and 29 FTEs over a 
period of up to six years. 
References 
[1] http://www.eurisol.org/site01/index.php 
[2] D.C. Fiander and A. Fowler, A 60 kV modulator for the target voltage of an on-line isotope 
separator, 20th Power Modulator Symposium, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, USA, June 1992, 
CERN/PS 92-38(RF). 
[3] R. Catherall et al., Radioactive ion beams produced by neutron-induced fission at ISOLDE, 
Nucl. Instrum. Methods B204 (2003) 235–239. 
[4] S. Meunier, Système vide ISOLDE, AT-VAC Technical Note 04-16, Ref: edms 537198.v2 de 
décembre 2004. 
[5] R. Catherall et al., The radioactive laboratory upgrade at ISOLDE, CERN, Nucl. Phys. A746 
(2004) 379c–383c. 
[6] J. Lettry et al., Effects of thermal shocks on the release of radioisotopes and on molten metal 
target vessels, Nucl. Instrum. Methods B204 (2003) 251–256. 
[7] http://www.targisol.csic.es/ 
[8] E. Bouquerel et al., Purification of a Zn radioactive ion beam by alkali suppression in a quartz 
line target prototype, to be published in European Physics Journal (RNB7 proceedings) 2006. 
[9] www.cern.ch/fluka/ 
[10] Ordonnance sur l’utilisation des sources radioactives non-scellées du 21 novembre 1997 (Etat 
23 décembre 1997), 814554, Switzerland (1997). 
JACQUES LETTRY AND RICHARD CATHERALL
20
